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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-8685
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TERRY LYNN STINSON, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the eleventh circuit
[May 3, 1993]

  Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In this case we review a decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit holding that the commen-
tary to the Sentencing Guidelines is not binding on the
federal courts.  We decide that commentary in the Guide-
lines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is
authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a
federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly errone-
ous reading of, that guideline.
  Petitioner Terry Lynn Stinson entered a plea of guilty
to a five-count indictment resulting from his robbery of a
Florida bank.  The presentence report recommended that
petitioner be sentenced as a career offender under the
Sentencing Guidelines.  See United States Sentencing
Commission, Guidelines Manual 4B1.1 (Nov. 1989).
Section 4B1.1 provided that a defendant is a career
offender if:
-(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at
the time of the instant offense, (2) the instant offense
of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense.-
All concede that petitioner was at least 18 years old when
the events leading to the indictment occurred and that he
then had at least two prior felony convictions for crimes
of violence, thereby satisfying the first and third elements
in the definition of career offender.  It is the second
element in this definition, the requirement that the
predicate offense be a crime of violence, that gave rise to
the ultimate problem in this case.  At the time of his
sentencing, the guidelines defined -crime of violence- as,
among other things, -any offense under federal or state
law punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year that . . . involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.-  4B1.2(1).
The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida found that petitioner's conviction for the offense
of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U. S. C.
922(g), was a crime of violence, satisfying the second
element of the career offender definition.  Although the
indictment contained other counts, the District Court
relied only upon the felon-in-possession offense in applying
the career offender provision of the guidelines.  In accord
with its conclusions, the District Court sentenced peti-
tioner as a career offender.
  On appeal, petitioner maintained his position that the
offense relied upon by the District Court was not a crime
of violence under USSG 4B1.1 and 4B1.2(1).  The Court
of Appeals affirmed, holding that possession of a firearm
by a felon was, as a categorical matter, a crime of vio-
lence.  943 F. 2d 1268, 1271-1273 (CA11 1991).  After its
decision, however, Amendment 433 to the Guidelines
Manual, which added a sentence to the commentary to
4B1.2, became effective.  The new sentence stated that
-[t]he term `crime of violence' does not include the offense
of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.-  USSG
App. C, at 253 (Nov. 1992).  See 4B1.2 comment., n. 2.
Petitioner sought rehearing, arguing that Amendment 433
should be given retroactive effect, but the Court of Ap-
peals adhered to its earlier interpretation of -crime of
violence- and denied the petition for rehearing in an
opinion.  957 F. 2d 813 (CA11 1992) (per curiam).
  Rather than considering whether the amendment should
be given retroactive application, the Court of Appeals held
that commentary to the Guidelines, though -persuasive,-
is of only -limited authority- and not -binding- on the
federal courts.  Id., at 815.  It rested this conclusion on
the fact that Congress does not review amendments to the
commentary under 28 U. S. C. 994(p).  The Court of
Appeals -decline[d] to be bound by the change in section
4B1.2's commentary until Congress amends section 4B1.2's
language to exclude specifically the possession of a firearm
by a felon as a `crime of violence.'-  957 F. 2d, at 815.
The various courts of appeals have taken conflicting
positions on the authoritative weight to be accorded to the
commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines, so we granted
certiorari.  506 U. S. ___ (1992).
  The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as amended, 18
U. S. C. 3551 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. III), 28
U. S. C. 991-998 (1988 ed. and Supp. III), created the
Sentencing Commission, 28 U. S. C. 991(a), and charged
it with the task of -establish[ing] sentencing policies and
practices for the Federal criminal justice system,-
991(b)(1).  See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361,
367-370 (1989).  The Commission executed this function
by promulgating the Guidelines Manual.  The Manual
contains text of three varieties.  First is a guideline
provision itself.  The Sentencing Reform Act establishes
that guidelines are -for use of a sentencing court in
determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal
case.-  28 U. S. C. 994(a)(1).  The guidelines provide
direction as to the appropriate type of punishment-proba-
tion, fine, or term of imprisonment-and the extent of the
punishment imposed.  994(a)(1)(A) and (B).  Amend-
ments to guidelines must be submitted to Congress for a
6-month period of review, during which Congress can
modify or disapprove them.  994(p).  The second variety
of text in the Manual is a policy statement.  The Sentenc-
ing Reform Act authorizes the promulgation of -general
policy statements regarding application of the guidelines-
or other aspects of sentencing that would further the
purposes of the Act.  994(a)(2).  The third variant of text
is commentary, at issue in this case.  In the Guidelines
Manual, both guidelines and policy statements are accom-
panied by extensive commentary.  Although the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act does not in express terms authorize the
issuance of commentary, the Act does refer to it.  See 18
U. S. C. 3553(b) (in determining whether to depart from
a guidelines range, -the court shall consider only the
sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official
commentary of the Sentencing Commission-).  The Sen-
tencing Commission has provided in a guideline that
commentary may serve these functions: commentary may
-interpret [a] guideline or explain how it is to be applied,-
-suggest circumstances which . . . may warrant departure
from the guidelines,- or -provide background information,
including factors considered in promulgating the guideline
or reasons underlying promulgation of the guideline.-
USSG 1B1.7.
  As we have observed, -the Guidelines bind judges and
courts in the exercise of their uncontested responsibility
to pass sentence in criminal cases.-  Mistretta v. United
States, supra, at 391.  See also Burns v. United States,
501 U. S. ___, ___ (1991) (slip op., at 3).  The most
obvious operation of this principle is with respect to
guidelines themselves.  The Sentencing Reform Act
provides that, unless the sentencing court finds an aggra-
vating or mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, not
given adequate consideration by the Commission, a
circumstance not applicable in this case, -[t]he court shall
impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range,-
established by the applicable guidelines.  18 U. S. C.
3553(a)(4), (b).  The principle that the Guidelines
Manual is binding on federal courts applies as well to
policy statements.  In Williams v. United States, 503 U. S.
___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 6), we said that -[w]here . . .
a policy statement prohibits a district court from taking
a specified action, the statement is an authoritative guide
to the meaning of the applicable guideline.-  There, the
District Court had departed upward from the guidelines'
sentencing range based on prior arrests that did not result
in criminal convictions.  A policy statement, however,
prohibited a court from basing a departure on a prior
arrest record alone.  USSG 4A1.3, p. s.  We held that
failure to follow the policy statement resulted in a sen-
tence -imposed as a result of an incorrect application of
the sentencing guidelines- under 18 U. S. C. 3742(f)(1)
that should be set aside on appeal unless the error was
harmless.  503 U. S., at ___, ___-___ (slip op., at 6, 8-9).
  In the case before us, the Court of Appeals determined
that these principles do not apply to commentary.  957
F. 2d, at 814-815.  Its conclusion that the commentary
now being considered is not binding on the courts was
error.  The commentary added by Amendment 433 was
interpretive and explanatory of the guideline defining
-crime of violence.-  Commentary which functions to
-interpret [a] guideline or explain how it is to be applied,-
USSG 1B1.7, controls, and if failure to follow, or a
misreading of, such commentary results in a sentence
-select[ed] . . . from the wrong guideline range,- Williams
v. United States, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 8), that sen-
tence would constitute -an incorrect application of the
sentencing guidelines- under 18 U. S. C. 3742(f)(1).  A
guideline itself makes this proposition clear.  See USSG
1B1.7 (-Failure to follow such commentary could consti-
tute an incorrect application of the guidelines, subjecting
the sentence to possible reversal on appeal-).  Our holding
in Williams dealing with policy statements applies with
equal force to the commentary before us here.  Cf. USSG
1B1.7 (commentary regarding departures from the
Guidelines should be -treated as the legal equivalent of
a policy statement-); 1B1.7, comment. (-Portions of [the
Guidelines Manual] not labeled as guidelines or commen-
tary . . . are to be construed as commentary and thus
have the force of policy statements-).
  It does not follow that commentary is binding in all
instances.  If, for example, commentary and the guideline
it interprets are inconsistent in that following one will
result in violating the dictates of the other, the Sentencing
Reform Act itself commands compliance with the guide-
line.  See 18 U. S. C. 3553(a)(4), (b).  Some courts have
refused to follow commentary in situations falling short
of such flat inconsistency.  Thus, we articulate the stan-
dard that governs the decision whether particular inter-
pretive or explanatory commentary is binding.
  Different analogies have been suggested as helpful
characterizations of the legal force of commentary.  Some
we reject.  We do not think it helpful to treat commentary
as a contemporaneous statement of intent by the drafters
or issuers of the guideline, having a status similar to that
of, for example, legislative committee reports or the
advisory committee notes to the various federal rules of
procedure and evidence.  Quite apart from the usual
difficulties of attributing meaning to a statutory or
regulatory command by reference to what other documents
say about its proposers' initial intent, here, as is often
true, the commentary was issued well after the guideline
it interprets had been promulgated.  The guidelines of the
Sentencing Commission, moreover, cannot become effective
until after the 6-month review period for congressional
modification or disapproval.  It seems inconsistent with
this process for the Commission to announce some state-
ment of initial intent well after the review process has
expired.  To be sure, much commentary has been issued
at the same time as the guideline it interprets.  But
neither the Guidelines Manual nor the Sentencing Reform
Act indicates that the weight accorded to, or the function
of, commentary differs depending on whether it represents
a contemporaneous or ex post interpretation.
  We also find inapposite an analogy to an agency's
construction of a federal statute that it administers.
Under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), if a statute is unam-
biguous the statute governs; if, however, Congress' silence
or ambiguity has -left a gap for the agency to fill,- courts
must defer to the agency's interpretation so long as it is
-a permissible construction of the statute.-  Id., at
842-843.  Commentary, however, has a function different
from an agency's legislative rule.  Commentary, unlike a
legislative rule, is not the product of delegated authority
for rulemaking, which of course must yield to the clear
meaning of a statute.  Id., at 843, n. 9.  Rather, commen-
tary explains the guidelines and provides concrete guid-
ance as to how even unambiguous guidelines are to be
applied in practice.
  Although the analogy is not precise because Congress
has a role in promulgating guidelines, we think the
Government is correct in suggesting that the commentary
be treated as an agency's interpretation of its own legisla-
tive rule.  Brief for United States 13-16.  The Sentencing
Commission promulgates guidelines by virtue of an
express congressional delegation of authority for rule-
making, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S., at
371-379, and through the informal rulemaking procedures
in 5 U. S. C. 553, see 28 U. S. C. 994(x).  Thus, the
guidelines are the equivalent of legislative rules adopted
by federal agencies.  The functional purpose of commen-
tary (of the kind at issue here) is to assist in the interpre-
tation and application of those rules, which are within the
Commission's particular area of concern and expertise and
which the Commission itself has the first responsibility to
formulate and announce.  In these respects this type of
commentary is akin to an agency's interpretation of its
own legislative rules.  As we have often stated, provided
an agency's interpretation of its own regulations does not
violate the Constitution or a federal statute, it must be
given -controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.-  Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410, 414 (1945).  See, e.g.,
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S.
332, 359 (1989); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U. S. 926, 939 (1986);
United States v. Larionoff, 431 U. S. 864, 872-873 (1977);
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1965).  See also 2
K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 7:22, pp. 105-107
(2d ed. 1979).
  According this measure of controlling authority to the
commentary is consistent with the role the Sentencing
Reform Act contemplates for the Sentencing Commission.
The Commission, after all, drafts the guidelines as well
as the commentary interpreting them, so we can presume
that the interpretations of the guidelines contained in the
commentary represent the most accurate indications of
how the Commission deems that the guidelines should be
applied to be consistent with the Guidelines Manual as
a whole as well as the authorizing statute.  The Commis-
sion has the statutory obligation -periodically [to] review
and revise- the guidelines in light of its consultation with
authorities on and representatives of the federal criminal
justice system.  See 28 U. S. C. 994(o).  The Commission
also must -revie[w] the presentence report, the guideline
worksheets, the tribunal's sentencing statement, and any
written plea agreement,- Mistretta v. United States, supra,
at 369-370, with respect to every federal criminal sen-
tence.  See 28 U. S. C. 994(w).  In assigning these
functions to the Commission, -Congress necessarily con-
templated that the Commission would periodically review
the work of the courts, and would make whatever clarify-
ing revisions to the Guidelines conflicting judicial decisions
might suggest.-  Braxton v. United States, 500 U. S. ___,
___ (1991) (slip op., at 4).  Although amendments to
guidelines provisions are one method of incorporating
revisions, another method open to the Commission is
amendment of the commentary, if the guideline which
the commentary interprets will bear the construction.
Amended commentary is binding on the federal courts
even though it is not reviewed by Congress, and prior ju-
dicial constructions of a particular guideline cannot pre-
vent the Commission from adopting a conflicting interpre-
tation that satisfies the standard we set forth today.
  It is perhaps ironic that the Sentencing Commission's
own commentary fails to recognize the full significance of
interpretive and explanatory commentary.  The commen-
tary to the guideline on commentary provides:
-[I]n seeking to understand the meaning of the guide-
lines courts likely will look to the commentary for
guidance as an indication of the intent of those who
wrote them.  In such instances, the courts will treat
the commentary much like legislative history or other
legal material that helps determine the intent of a
drafter.-  USSG 1B1.7, comment.
We note that this discussion is phrased in predictive
terms.  To the extent that this commentary has prescrip-
tive content, we think its exposition of the role of inter-
pretive and explanatory commentary is inconsistent with
the uses to which the Commission in practice has put
such commentary and the command in 1B1.7 that failure
to follow interpretive and explanatory commentary could
result in reversible error.
  We now apply these principles to Amendment 433.  We
recognize that the exclusion of the felon-in-possession
offense from the definition of -crime of violence- may not
be compelled by the guideline text.  Nonetheless, Amend-
ment 433 does not run afoul of the Constitution or a
federal statute, and it is not -plainly erroneous or incon-
sistent- with 4B1.2, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., supra, at 414.  As a result, the commentary is a
binding interpretation of the phrase -crime of violence.-
Federal courts may not use the felon-in-possession offense
as the predicate crime of violence for purposes of imposing
the career offender provision of USSG 4B1.1 as to those
defendants to whom Amendment 433 applies.
  The Government agrees that the Court of Appeals erred
in concluding that commentary is not binding on the
federal courts and in ruling that Amendment 433 is not
of controlling weight.  See Brief for United States 11-19.
It suggests, however, that we should affirm the judgment
on an alternative ground.  It argues that petitioner's
sentence conformed with the Guidelines Manual in effect
when he was sentenced, id., at 22-29, and that the sen-
tence may not be reversed on appeal based upon a
postsentence amendment to the provisions in the Manual,
id., at 19-22.  The Government claims that petitioner's
only recourse is to file a motion in District Court for
resentencing, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. 3582(c)(2).  Brief
for United States 33-35.  It notes that after the Court of
Appeals denied rehearing in this case, the Sentencing
Commission amended USSG 1B1.10(d), p. s., to indicate
that Amendment 433 may be given retroactive effect
under 3582(c)(2).  See Amendment 469, USSG App. C,
at 296 (Nov. 1992).
  We decline to address this argument.  In refusing to
upset petitioner's sentence, the Court of Appeals did not
consider the nonretroactivity theory here advanced by the
Government; its refusal to vacate the sentence was based
only on its view that commentary did not bind it.  This
issue, moreover, is not -fairly included- in the question we
formulated in the grant of certiorari, see 506 U. S. ___
(1992).  Cf. this Court's Rule 14.1(a).  We leave the
contentions of the parties on this aspect of the case to be
addressed by the Court of Appeals on remand.
  The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                      It is so ordered.